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Abraham Lincoln vs. Stephen Douglas
U.S. Senatorial Candidates Debated in Galesburg, Illinois, 150 Years Ago
October 7, 1858
Mr. Douglas's Speech / Mr. Lincoln's Reply / Mr. Douglas's Reply

Mr. Douglas's Speech
When Senator Douglas appeared on the stand he was greeted with three tremendous cheers. He said:
Ladies and Gentlemen: Four years ago I appeared before the people of Knox county for the purpose of
defending my political action upon the Compromise measures of 1850 and the passage of the KansasNebraska bill. Those of you before me, who were present then, will remember that I vindicated myself for
supporting those two measures by the fact that they rested upon the great fundamental principle that the
people of each State and each Territory of this Union have the right, and ought to be permitted to exercise
the right, of regulating their own domestic concerns in their own way, subject to no other limitation or
restriction than that which the Constitution of the United States imposes upon them. I then called upon the
people of Illinois to decide whether that principle of self-government was right or wrong. If it was and is
right, then the Compromise measures of 1850 were right, and, consequently, the Kansas and Nebraska bill,
based upon the same principle, must necessarily have been right. (That's so, and cheers.)
The Kansas and Nebraska bill declared, in so many words, that it was the true intent and meaning of the act
not to legislate slavery into any State or Territory, nor to exclude it therefrom, but to leave the people
thereof perfectly free to form and regulate their domestic institutions in their own way, subject only to the
Constitution of the United States. For the last four years I have devoted all my energies, in private and
public, to commend that principle to the American people. Whatever else may be said in condemnation or
support of my political course, I apprehend that no honest man will doubt the fidelity with which, under all
circumstances, I have stood by it.

Lincoln-Douglas Debates
First Debate
Ottawa, Illinois
August 21, 1858
Second Debate
Freeport, Illinois
August 27, 1858

Third Debate
Jonesboro, Illinois
During the last year a question arose in the Congress of the United States whether or not that principle
September
15, 1858
would be violated by the admission of Kansas into the Union under the Lecompton Constitution. In my
opinion, the attempt to force Kansas in under that Constitution, was a gross violation of the principle
Fourth Debate
enunciated in the Compromise measures of 1850, and Kansas and Nebraska bill of 1854, and therefore I led
Charleston, Illinois
off in the fight against the Lecompton Constitution, and conducted it until the effort to carry that
September 18, 1858
Constitution through Congress was abandoned. And I can appeal to all men, friends and foes, Democrats
and Republicans, Northern men and Southern men, that during the whole of that fight I carried the banner
Fifth Debate
of Popular Sovereignty aloft, and never allowed it to trail in the dust, or lowered my flag until victory
Galesburg, Illinois
perched upon our arms. (Cheers!) When the Lecompton Constitution was defeated, the question arose in
October
7, 1858
the minds of those who had advocated it what they should next resort to in order to carry out their views.
They devised a measure known as the English bill, and granted a general amnesty and political pardon to
Sixth Debate
all men who had fought against the Lecompton Constitution, provided they would support that bill. I for
Quincy, Illinois
one did not choose to accept the pardon, or to avail myself of the amnesty granted on that condition. The
October 13, 1858
fact that the supporters of Lecompton were willing to forgive all differences of opinion at that time in the
event those who opposed it favored the English bill, was an admission they did not think that opposition to
Seventh Debate
Lecompton impaired a man's standing in the Democratic party. Now the question arises, what was that
Alton, Illinois
English bill which certain men are now attempting to make a test of political orthodoxy in this country. It
October 15, 1858
provided, in substance, that the Lecompton Constitution should be sent back to the people of Kansas for
their adoption or rejection, at an election which was held in August last, and in case they refused admission
under it, that Kansas should be kept out of the Union until she had 93,420 inhabitants. I was in favor of
sending the Constitution back in order to enable the people to say whether or not it was their act and deed, and embodied their will; but the other
proposition, that if they refused to come into the Union under it, they should be kept out until they had double or treble the population they then
had, I never would sanction by my vote. The reason why I could not sanction it is to be found in the fact that by the English bill, if the people of
Kansas had only agreed to become a slaveholding State under the Lecompton Constitution, they could have done so with 35,000 people, but if
they insisted on being a free State, as they had a right to do, then they were to be punished by being kept out of the Union until they had nearly
three times that population. I then said in my place in the Senate, as I now say to you, that whenever Kansas has population enough for a slave
State she has population enough for a free State. (That's it, and cheers.) I have never yet given a vote, and I never intend to record one, making an
odious and unjust distinction between the different States of this Union. (Applause.) I hold it to be a fundamental principle in our republican form
of government that all the States of this Union, old and new, free and slave, stand on an exact equality. Equality among the different States is a
cardinal principle on which all our institutions rest. Wherever, therefore, you make a discrimination, saying to a slave State that it shall be
admitted with 35,000 inhabitants, and to a free State that it shall not be admitted until it has 93,000 or 100,000 inhabitants, you are throwing the
whole weight of the Federal Government into the scale in favor of one class of States against the other. Nor would I on the other hand any sooner
sanction the doctrine that a free State could be admitted into the Union with 35,000 people, while a slave State was kept out until it had 93,
The effort has been and is now being made in this State by certain postmasters and other Federal office-holders, to make a test of faith on the
support of the English bill. These men are now making speeches all over the State against me and in favor of Lincoln, either directly or indirectly,
because I would not sanction a discrimination between slave and free States by voting for the English bill. But while that bill is made a test in
Illinois for the purpose of breaking up the Democratic organization in this State, how is it in the other States? Go to Indiana, and there you find
English himself, the author of the English bill, who is a candidate for re-election to Congress, has been forced by public opinion to abandon his
own darling project, and to give a promise that he will vote for the admission of Kansas at once, whenever she forms a Constitution in pursuance
of law, and ratifies it by a majority vote of her people. Not only is this the case with English himself, but I am informed that every Democratic
candidate for Congress in Indiana takes the same ground. Pass to Ohio, and there you find that Groesbeck, and Pendleton, and Cox, and all the
other anti-Lecompton men who stood shoulder to shoulder with me against the Lecompton Constitution, but voted for the English bill, now
repudiate it and take the same ground that I do on that question. So it is with the Joneses and others of Pennsylvania, and so it is with every other
Lecompton Democrat in the free States. They now abandon even the English bill, and come back to the true platform which I proclaimed at the
time in the Senate, and upon which the Democracy of Illinois now stand. And yet, notwithstanding the fact, that every Lecompton and antiLecompton Democrat in the free States has abandoned the English bill, you are told that it is to be made a test upon me, while the power and
patronage of the Government are all exerted to elect men to Congress in the other States who occupy the same position with reference to it that I
do. It seems that my political offense consists in the fact that I first did not vote for the English bill, and thus pledge myself to keep Kansas out of
the Union until she has a population of 93,420, and then return home, violate that pledge, repudiate the bill, and take the opposite ground. If I had
done this, perhaps the Administration would now be advocating my re-election, as it is that of the others who have pursued this course. I did not
choose to give that pledge, for the reason that I did not intend to carry out that principle. I never will consent, for the sake of conciliating the
frowns of power, to pledge myself to do that which I do not intend to perform. I now submit the question to you as my constituency, whether I
was not right, first, in resisting the adoption of the Lecompton Constitution; and secondly, in resisting the English bill. (An universal "Yes," from
the crowd.) I repeat, that I opposed the Lecompton Constitution because it was not the act and deed of the people of Kansas, and did not embody
their will. I denied the right of any power on earth, under our system of Government, to force a Constitution on an unwilling people. (Hear, hear;
that's the doctrine and cheers.) There was a time when some men could pretend to believe that the Lecompton Constitution embodied the will of
the people of Kansas, but that time has passed. The question was referred to the people of Kansas under the English bill last August, and then, at
a fair election, they rejected the Lecompton Constitution by a vote of from eight to ten against it to one in its favor. Since it has been voted down
by so overwhelming a majority, no man can pretend that it was the act and deed of that people. (That's so; and cheers.) I submit the question to
you whether or not, if it had not been for me, that Constitution would have been crammed down the throats of the people of Kansas against their
consent. (It would, it would. Hurra for Douglas; three cheers for Dougl
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Now, let me ask you whether the country has any interest in sustaining this organization, known as the Republican party. That party is unlike all
other political organizations in this country. All other parties have been national in their character-have avowed their principles alike in the slave
and free States, in Kentucky as well as Illinois, in Louisiana as well as in Massachusetts. Such was the case with the old Whig party, and such
was and is the case with the Democratic party. Whigs and Democrats could proclaim their principles boldly and fearlessly in the North and in the
South, in the East and in the West, wherever the Constitution ruled and the American flag waved over American soil.
But now you have a sectional organization, a party which appeals to the Northern section of the Union against the Southern, a party which
appeals to Northern passion, Northern pride, Northern ambition, and Northern prejudices, against Southern people, the Southern States, and
Southern institutions. The leaders of that party hope that they will be able to unite the Northern States in one great sectional party, and inasmuch
as the North is the strongest section, that they will thus be enabled to out vote, conquer, govern, and control the South. Hence you find that they
now make speeches advocating principles and measures which cannot be defended in any slaveholding State of this Union. Is there a Republican
residing in Galesburgh who can travel into Kentucky and carry his principles with him across the Ohio? (No.) What Republican from
Massachusetts can visit the Old Dominion without leaving his principles behind him when he crosses Mason and Dixon's line? Permit me to say
to you in perfect good humor, but in all sincerity, that no political creed is sound which cannot be proclaimed fearlessly in every State of this
Union where the Federal Constitution is not the supreme law of the land. ("That's so," and cheers.) Not only is this Republican party unable to
proclaim its principles alike in the North and in the South, in the free States and in the slave States, but it cannot even proclaim them in the same
forms and o give them the same strength and meaning in all parts of the same State. My friend Lincoln finds it extremely difficult to manage a
debate in the center part of the State, where there is a mixture of men from the North and the South. In the extreme Northern part of Illinois he
can proclaim as bold and radical Abolitionism as ever Giddings, Lovejoy, or Garrison enunciated, but when he gets down a little further South he
claims that he is an old line Whig, (great laughter,) a disciple of Henry Clay, ("Singleton says he defeated Clay's nomination for the Presidency,"
and cries of "that's so,") and declares that he still adheres to the old line Whig creed, and has nothing whatever to do with Abolitionism, or negro
equality, or negro citizenship. ("Hurrah for Douglas.") I once before hinted this of Mr. Lincoln in a public speech, and at Charleston he defied me
to show that there was any difference between his speeches in the North and in the South, and that they were not in strict harmony. I will now call
your attention to two of them, and you can then say whether you would be apt to believe that the same man ever uttered both. (Laughter and
cheers.) In a speech in reply to me at Chicago in July last, Mr. Lincoln, in speaking of the equality of the negro with the white man, used the
following language:
"I should like to know, if taking this old Declaration of Independence, which declares that all men are equal upon principle, and making
exceptions to it, where will it stop? If one man says it does not mean a negro, why may not another man say it does not mean another man? If the
Declaration is not the truth, let us get the statute book in which we find it and tear it out. Who is so bold as to do it? If it is not true, let us tear it
out."
You find that Mr. Lincoln there proposed that if the doctrine of the Declaration of Independence, declaring all men to be born equal, did not
include the negro and put him on an equality with the white man, that we should take the statute book and tear it out. (Laughter and cheers.) He
there took the ground that the negro race is included in the Declaration of Independence as the equal of the white race, and that there could be no
such thing as a distinction in the races, making one superior and the other inferior. I read now from the same speech:
"My friends [he says], I have detained you about as long as I desire to do, and I have only to say let us discard all this quibbling about this man
and the other man-this race and that race and the other race being inferior, and therefore they must be placed in an inferior position, discarding
our standard that we have left us. Let us discard all these things, and unite as one people throughout this land, until we shall once more stand up
declaring that all men are created equal."
["That's right," etc.]
Yes, I have no doubt that you think it is right, but the Lincoln men down in Coles, Tazewell and Sangamon counties do not think it is right. In the
conclusion of the same speech, talking to the Chicago Abolitionists, he said: "I leave you, hoping that the lamp of liberty will burn in your
bosoms until there shall no longer be a doubt that all men are created free and equal." ["Good, good."] Well, you say good to that, and you are
going to vote for Lincoln because he holds that doctrine. I will not blame you for supporting him on that ground, but I will show you in
immediate contrast with that doctrine, what Mr. Lincoln said down in Egypt in order to get votes in that locality where they do not hold to such a
doctrine. In a joint discussion between Mr. Lincoln and myself, at Charleston, I think, on the 18th of last month, Mr. Lincoln, referring to this
subject, used the following language:
"I will say then, that I am not nor never have been in favor of bringing about in any way the social and political equality of the white and black
races; that I am not nor never have been in favor of making voters of the free negroes, or jurors, or qualifying them to hold office, or having them
to marry with white people. I will say in addition, that there is a physical difference between the white and black races, which, I suppose, will
forever forbid the two races living together upon terms of social and political equality, and inasmuch as they cannot so live, that while they do
remain together, there must be the position of superior and inferior, that I as much as any other man am in favor of the superior position being
assigned to the white man."
["Good for Lincoln."]
Fellow-citizens, here you find men hurraing for Lincoln and saying that he did right, when in one part of the State he stood up for negro equality,
and in another part for political effect, discarded the doctrine and declared that there always must be a superior and inferior race. Abolitionists up
north are expected and required to vote for Lincoln because he goes for the equality of the races, holding that by the Declaration of Independence
the white man and the negro were created equal, and endowed by the Divine law with that equality, and down south he tells the old Whigs, the
Kentuckians, Virginians, and Tennesseeans, that there is a physical difference in the races, making one superior and the other inferior, and that he
is in favor of maintaining the superiority of the white race over the negro. Now, how can you reconcile those two positions of Mr. Lincoln? He is
to be voted for in the south as a pro-slavery man, and he is to be voted for in the north as an Abolitionist. Up here he thinks it is all nonsense to
talk about a difference between the races, and says that we must "discard all quibbling about this race and that race and the other race being
inferior, and therefore they must be placed in an inferior position." Down south he makes this "quibble" about this race and that race and the other
race being inferior as the creed of his party, and declares that the negro can never be elevated to the position of the white man. You find that his
political meetings are called by different names in different counties in the State. Here they are called Republican meetings, but in old Tazewell,
where Lincoln made a speech last Tuesday, he did not address a Republican meeting, but "a grand rally of the Lincoln men." There are very few
Republicans there, because Tazewell county is filled with old Virginians and Kentuckians, all of whom are Whigs or Democrats, and if Mr.
Lincoln had called an Abolition or Republican meeting there, he would not get many votes. Go down into Egypt and you find that he and his
party are operating under an alias there, which his friend Trumbull has given them, in order that they may cheat the people. When I was down in
Monroe county a few weeks ago addressing the people, I saw handbills posted announcing that Mr. Trumbull was going to speak in behalf of
Lincoln, and what do you think the name of his party was there? Why the "Free Democracy." Mr. Trumbull and Mr. Jehu Baker were announced
to address the Free Democracy of Monroe county, and the bill was signed "Many Free Democrats." The reason that Lincoln and his party adopted
the name of "Free Democracy" down there was because Monroe county has always been an old-fashioned Democratic county, and hence it was
necessary to make the people believe that they were Democrats, sympathized with them, and were fighting for Lincoln as Democrats. Come up to
Springfield, where Lincoln now lives and always has lived, and you find that the Convention of his party which assembled to nominate
candidates for Legislature, who are expected to vote for him if elected, dare not adopt the name of Republican, but assembled under the title of
"all opposed to the Democracy." Thus you find that Mr. Lincoln's creed cannot travel through even one half of the counties of this State, but that
it changes its hues and becomes lighter and lighter, as it travels from the extreme north, until it is nearly white, when it reaches the extreme south
end of the State. I ask you, my friends, why cannot Republicans avow their principles alike every where? I would despise myself if I thought that
I was procuring your votes by concealing my opinions, and by avowing one set of principles in one part of the State, and a different set in another
part. If I do not truly and honorably represent your feelings and principles, then I ought not to be your Senator; and I will never conceal my
opinions, or modify or change them a hair's breadth in order to get votes. I tell you that
I say to you, frankly, that in my opinion, this Government was made by our fathers on the white basis. It was made by white men for the benefit
of white men and their posterity forever, and was intended to be administered by white men in all time to come. But while I hold that under our
Constitution and political system the negro is not a citizen, cannot be a citizen, and ought not to be a citizen, it does not follow by any means that
he should be a slave. On the contrary it does follow that the negro, as an inferior race, ought to possess every right, every privilege, every
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immunity which he can safely exercise consistent with the safety of the society in which he lives. Humanity requires, and Christianity commands,
that you shall extend to every inferior being, and every dependent being, all the privileges, immunities and advantages which can be granted to
them consistent with the safety of society. If you ask me the nature and extent of these privileges, I answer that that is a question which the
people of each State must decide for themselves. Illinois has decided that question for herself. We have said that in this State the negro shall not
be a slave, nor shall he be a citizen. Kentucky holds a different doctrine. New York holds one different from either, and Maine one different from
all. Virginia, in her policy on this question, differs in many respects from the others, and so on, until there is hardly two States whose policy is
exactly alike in regard to the relation of the white man and the negro. Nor can you reconcile them and make them alike. Each State must do as it
pleases. Illinois had as much right to adopt the policy which we have on that subject as Kentucky had to adopt a different policy. The great
principle of this Government is, that each State has the right to do as it pleases on all these questions, and no other State, or power on earth has
the right to interfere with us, or complain of us merely because our system differs from theirs. In the Compromise Measures of 1850, Mr. Clay
declared that this great principle ought to exist in the Territories as well as in the States, and I reasserted his doctrine in the Kansas and Nebraska
bill in 1854.
But Mr. Lincoln cannot be made to understand, and those who are determined to vote for him, no matter whether he is a proslavery man in the
south and a negro equality advocate in the north, cannot be made to understand how it is that in a Territory the people can do as they please on
the slavery question under the Dred Scott decision. Let us see whether I cannot explain it to the satisfaction of all impartial men. Chief Justice
Taney has said in his opinion in the Dred Scott case, that a negro slave being property, stands on an equal footing with other property, and that
the owner may carry them into United States territory the same as he does other property. Suppose any two of you, neighbors, should conclude to
go to Kansas, one carrying $100,000 worth of negro slaves and the other $100,000 worth of mixed merchandise, including quantities of liquors.
You both agree that under that decision you may carry your property to Kansas, but when you get it there, the merchant who is possessed of the
liquors is met by the Maine liquor law, which prohibits the sale or use of his property, and the owner of the slaves is met by equally unfriendly
legislation, which makes his property worthless after he gets it there. What is the right to carry your property into the Territory worth to either,
when unfriendly legislation in the Territory renders it worthless after you get it there? The slaveholder when he gets his slaves there finds that
there is no local law to protect him in holding them, no slave code, no police regulation maintaining and sup porting him in his right, and he
discovers at once that the absence of such friendly legislation excludes his property from the Territory, just as irresistibly as if there was a
positive Constitutional prohibition excluding it. Thus you find it is with any kind of property in a Territory, it depends for its protection on the
local and municipal law. If the people of a Territory want slavery, they make friendly legislation to introduce it, but if they do not want it, they
withhold all protection from it, and then it cannot exist there. Such was the view taken on the subject by different Southern men when the
Nebraska bill passed. See the speech of Mr. Orr, of South Carolina, the present Speaker of the House of Representatives of Congress, made at
that time, and there you will find this whole doctrine argued out at full length. Read the speeches of other Southern Congressmen, Senators and
Representatives, made in 1854, and you will find that they took the same view of the subject as Mr. Orr-that slavery could never be forced on a
people who did not want it. I hold that in this country there is no power on the face of the globe that can force any institution on an unwilling
people. The great fundamental principle of our Government is that the people of each State and each Territory shall be left perfectly free to
decide for themselves what shall be the nature and character of their institutions. When this Government was made, it was based on that
principle. At the time of its formation there were twelve slaveholding States and one free State in this Union. Suppose this doctrine of Mr.
Lincoln and the Republicans, of uniformity of laws of all the States on the subject of slavery, had prevailed; suppose Mr. Lincoln himself had
been a member of the Convention which framed the Constitution, and that he had risen in that august body, and addressing the father of his
country, had said as he did at Springfield:
"A house divided against itself cannot stand. I believe this Government cannot endure permanently half slave and half free. I do not expect the
Union to be dissolved-I do not expect the house to fall, but I do expect it will cease to be divided. It will become all one thing or all the other."
What do you think would have been the result? (Hurrah for Douglas.) Suppose he had made that Convention believe that doctrine and they had
acted upon it, what do you think would have been the result? Do you believe that the one free State would have outvoted the twelve slaveholding
States, and thus abolish slavery? (No! no! and cheers.) On the contrary, would not the twelve slaveholding States have outvoted the one free
State, and under his doctrine have fastened slavery by an irrevocable Constitutional provision upon every inch of the American Republic? Thus
you see that the doctrine he now advocates, if proclaimed at the beginning of the Government, would have established slavery every where
throughout the American continent, and are you willing, now that we have the majority section, to exercise a power which we never would have
submitted to when we were in the minority? If the Southern States had attempted to control our institutions, and make the States all slave when
they had the power, I ask would you have submitted to it? If you would not, are you willing now, that we have become the strongest under that
great principle of self-government that allows each State to do as it pleases, to attempt to control the Southern institutions? ("No, no.") Then, my
friends, I say to you that there is but one path of peace in this Republic, and that is to administer this Government as our fathers made it, divided
into free and slave States, allowing each State to decide for itself whether it wants slavery or not. If Illinois will settle the slavery question for
herself, and mind her own business and let her neighbors alone, we will be at peace with Kentucky, and every other Southern State. If every other
State in the Union will do the same there will be peace between the North and the South, and in the whole Union.
I am told that my time has expired.
(Nine cheers for Douglas.)

Mr. Lincoln's Reply
Mr. Lincoln was received as he came forward with three enthusiastic cheers, coming from every part of the vast assembly. After silence was
restored, Mr. Lincoln said:
MY FELLOW-CITIZENS:-A very large portion of the speech which Judge Douglas has addressed to you has previously been delivered and put
in print. [Laughter.] I do not mean that for a hit upon the Judge at all. [Renewed laughter.] If I had not been interrupted, I was going to say that
such an answer as I was able to make to a very large portion of it, had already been more than once made and published. There has been an
opportunity afforded to the public to see our respective views upon the topics discussed in a large portion of the speech which he has just
delivered. I make these remarks for the purpose of excusing myself for not passing over the entire ground that the Judge has traversed. I however
desire to take up some of the points that he has attended to, and ask your attention to them, and I shall follow him backwards upon some notes
which I have taken, reversing the order by beginning where he concluded.
The Judge has alluded to the Declaration of Independence, and insisted that negroes are not included in that Declaration; and that it is a slander
upon the framers of that instrument, to suppose that negroes were meant therein; and he asks you: Is it possible to believe that Mr. Jefferson, who
penned the immortal paper, could have supposed himself applying the language of that instrument to the negro race, and yet held a portion of that
race in slavery? Would he not at once have freed them? I only have to remark upon this part of the Judge's speech (and that, too, very briefly, for
I shall not detain myself, or you, upon that point for any great length of time), that I believe the entire records of the world, from the date of the
Declaration of Independence up to within three years ago, may be searched in vain for one single affirmation, from one single man, that the negro
was not included in the Declaration of Independence; I think I may defy Judge Douglas to show that he ever said so, that Washington ever said
so, that any President ever said so, that any member of Congress ever said so, or that any living man upon the whole earth ever said so, until the
necessities of the present policy of the Democratic party, in regard to slavery, had to invent that affirmation. And I will remind Judge Douglas
and this audience, that while Mr. Jefferson was the owner of slaves, as undoubtedly he was, in speaking upon this very subject, he used the strong
language that "he trembled for his country when he remembered that God was just;" and I will offer the highest premium in my power to Judge
Douglas if he will show that he, in all his life, ever uttered a sentiment at all akin to that of Jefferson.
The next thing to which I will ask your attention is the Judge's comments upon the fact, as he assumes it to be, that we cannot call our public
meetings as Republican meetings; and he instances Tazewell county as one of the places where the friends of Lincoln have called a public
meeting and have not dared to name it a Republican meeting. He instances Monroe county as another where Judge Trumbull and Jehu Baker
addressed the persons whom the Judge assumes to be the friends of Lincoln, calling them the "Free Democracy." I have the honor to inform
Judge Douglas that he spoke in that very county of Tazewell last Saturday, and I was there on Tuesday last, and when he spoke there he spoke
under a call not venturing to use the word "Democrat." [Turning to Judge Douglas.] What think you of this?
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So again, there is another thing to which I would ask the Judge's attention upon this subject. In the contest of 1856 his party delighted to call
themselves together as the "National Democracy," but now, if there should be a notice put up any where for a meeting of the "National
Democracy," Judge Douglas and his friends would not come. They would not suppose themselves invited. They would understand that it was a
call for those hateful postmasters whom he talks about.
Now a few words in regard to these extracts from speeches of mine, which Judge Douglas has read to you, and which he supposes are in very
great contrast to each other. Those speeches have been before the public for a considerable time, and if they have any inconsistency in them, if
there is any conflict in them, the public have been unable to detect it. When the Judge says, in speaking on this subject, that I make speeches of
one sort for the people of the northern end of the State, and of a different sort for the southern people, he assumes that I do not understand that my
speeches will be put in print and read north and south. I knew all the while that the speech that I made at Chicago, and the one I made at
Jonesboro and the one at Charleston, would all be put in print and all the reading and intelligent men in the community would see them and know
all about my opinions. And I have not supposed, and do not now suppose, that there is any conflict whatever between them. But the Judge will
have it that if we do not confess that there is a sort of inequality between the white and black races, which justifies us in making them slaves, we
must, then, insist that there is a degree of equality that requires us to make them our wives. Now, I have all the while taken a broad distinction in
regard to that matter; and that is all there is in these different speeches which he arrays here, and the entire reading of either of the speeches will
show that that distinction was made. Perhaps by taking two parts of the same speech, he could have got up as much of a conflict as the one he has
found. I have all the while maintained, that in so far as it should be insisted that there was an equality between the white and black races that
should produce a perfect social and political equality, it was an impossibility. This you have seen in my printed speeches, and with it I have said,
that in their right to "life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness," as proclaimed in that old Declaration, the inferior races are our equals. And these
declarations I have constantly made in reference to the abstract moral question, to contemplate and consider when we are legislating about any
new country which is not already cursed with the actual presence of the evil-slavery. I have never manifested any impatience with the necessities
that spring from the actual presence of black people amongst us, and the actual existence of slavery amongst us where it does already exist; but I
have insisted that, in legislating for new countries, where it does not exist, there is no just rule other than that of moral and abstract right! With
reference to those new countries, those maxims as to the right of a people to "life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness," were the just rules to be
constantly referred to. There is no misunderstanding this, except by men interested to misunderstand it. I take it that I have to address an
intelligent and reading community, who will peruse what I say, weigh it, and then judge whether I advance improper or unsound views, or
whether I advance hypocritical, and deceptive, and contrary views in different portions of the country. I believe myself to be guilty of no such
thing as the latter, though, of course, I cannot claim that I am entirely free from all error in the opinions I advance.
The Judge has also detained us awhile in regard to the distinction between his party and our party. His he assumes to be a national party-ours a
sectional one. He does this in asking the question whether this country has any interest in the maintenance of the Republican party? He assumes
that our party is altogether sectional-that the party to which he adheres is national; and the argument is, that no party can be a rightful party-can
be based upon rightful principles-unless it can announce its principles every where. I presume that Judge Douglas could not go into Russia and
announce the doctrine of our national Democracy; he could not denounce the doctrine of kings and emperors and monarchies in Russia; and it
may be true of this country, that in some places we may not be able to proclaim a doctrine as clearly true as the truth of Democracy, because there
is a section so directly opposed to it that they will not tolerate us in doing so. Is it the true test of the soundness of a doctrine, that in some places
people won't let you proclaim it? Is that the way to test the truth of any doctrine? Why, I understood that at one time the people of Chicago would
not let Judge Douglas preach a certain favorite doctrine of his. I commend to his consideration the question, whether he takes that as a test of the
unsoundness of what he wanted to preach.
There is another thing to which I wish to ask attention for a little while on this occasion. What has always been the evidence brought forward to
prove that the Republican party is a sectional party? The main one was that in the Southern portion of the Union the people did not let the
Republicans proclaim their doctrines amongst them. That has been the main evidence brought forward-that they had no supporters, or
substantially none, in the slave States. The South have not taken hold of our principles as we announce them; nor does Judge Douglas now
grapple with those principles. We have a Republican State Platform, laid down in Springfield in June last, stating our position all the way through
the questions before the country. We are now far advanced in this canvass. Judge Douglas and I have made perhaps forty speeches apiece, and we
have now for the fifth time met face to face in debate, and up to this day I have not found either Judge Douglas or any friend of his taking hold of
the Republican platform or laying his finger upon anything in it that is wrong. I ask you all to recollect that. Judge Douglas turns away from the
platform of principles to the fact that he can find people somewhere who will not allow us to announce those principles. If he had great
confidence that our principles were wrong, he would take hold of them and demonstrate them to be wrong. But he does not do so. The only
evidence he has of their being wrong is in the fact that there are people who won't allow us to preach them. I ask again is that the way to test the
soundness of a doctrine?
I ask his attention also to the fact that by the rule of nationality he is himself fast becoming sectional. I ask his attention to the fact that his
speeches would not go as current now south of the Ohio river as they have formerly gone there. I ask his attention to the fact that he felicitates
himself to-day that all the Democrats of the free States are agreeing with him, while he omits to tell us that the Democrats of any slave State
agree with him. If he has not thought of this, I commend to his consideration the evidence in his own declaration, on this day, of his becoming
sectional too. I see it rapidly approaching. Whatever may be the result of this ephemeral contest between Judge Douglas and myself, I see the day
rapidly approaching when his pill of sectionalism, which he has been thrusting down the throats of Republicans for years past, will be crowded
down his own throat.
Now in regard to what Judge Douglas said (in the beginning of his speech) about the Compromise of 1850, containing the principle of the
Nebraska bill, although I have often presented my views upon that subject, yet as I have not done so in this canvass, I will, if you please, detain
you a little with them. I have always maintained, so far as I was able, that there was nothing of the principle of the Nebraska bill in the
Compromise of 1850 at all-nothing whatever. Where can you find the principle of the Nebraska bill in that Compromise? If any where, in the two
pieces of the Compromise organizing the Territories of New Mexico and Utah. It was expressly provided in these two acts, that, when they came
to be admitted into the Union, they should be admitted with or without slavery, as they should choose, by their own Constitutions. Nothing was
said in either of those acts as to what was to be done in relation to slavery during the territorial existence of those Territories, while Henry Clay
constantly made the declaration (Judge Douglas recognizing him as a leader) that, in his opinion, the old Mexican laws would control that
question during the territorial existence, and that these old Mexican laws excluded slavery. How can that be used as a principle for declaring that
during the territorial existence as well as at the time of framing the Constitution, the people, if you please, might have slaves if they wanted
them? I am not discussing the question whether it is right or wrong; but how are the New Mexican and Utah laws patterns for the Nebraska bill? I
maintain that the organization of Utah and New Mexico did not establish a general principle at all. It had no feature of establishing a general
principle. The acts to which I have referred were a part of a general system of Compromises. They did not lay down what was proposed as a
regular policy for the Territories; only an agreement in this particular case to do in that way, because other things were done that were to be a
compensation for it. They were allowed to come in in that shape, because in another way it was paid for-considering that as a part of that system
of measures called the Compromise of 1850, which finally included half a dozen acts. It included the admission of California as a free State,
which was kept out of the Union for half a year because it had formed a free Constitution. It included the settlement of the boundary of Texas,
which had been undefined before, which was in itself a slavery question; for, if you pushed the line farther west, you made Texas larger, and
made more slave Territory; while, if you drew the line toward the east, you narrowed the boundary and diminished the domain of slavery, and by
so much increased free Territory. It included the abolition of the slave-trade in the District of Columbia. It included the passage of a new Fugitive
Slave law. All these things were put together, and though passed in separate acts, were nevertheless in legislation (as the speeches at the time will
show), made to depend upon each other. Each got votes, with the understanding that the other measures were to pass, and by this system of
Compromise, in that series of measures, those two bills-the New Mexico and Utah bills-were passed; and I say for that reason they could not be
taken as models, framed upon their own intrinsic principle, for all future Territories. And I have the evidence of this in the fact that Judge
Douglas, a year afterward, or more than a year afterward, perhaps, when he first introduced bills for the purpose of framing new Territories, did
not attempt to follow these bills of New Mexico and Utah; and even when he introduced this Nebraska bill, I think you will discover that he did
not exactly follow them. But I do not wish to dwell at great length upon this branch of the discussion. My own opinion is, that a thorough
investigation will show most plainly that the New Mexico and Utah bills were part of a system of Compromise, and n
The Judge tells, in proceeding, that he is opposed to making any odious distinctions between free and slave States. I am altogether unaware that
the Republicans are in favor of making any odious distinctions between the free and slave States. But there still is a difference, I think, between
Judge Douglas and the Republicans in this. I suppose that the real difference between Judge Douglas and his friends, and the Republicans on the

http://www.gvsu.edu/hauenstein/150-years-later-lincoln-douglas-debate-in-galesburg-26.htm

3/2/2011

150 Years Later: Lincoln-Douglas Debate in Galesburg - The Hauenstein Center for Presi... Page 5 of 9

contrary, is, that the Judge is not in favor of making any difference between slavery and liberty-that he is in favor of eradicating, of pressing out
of view, the questions of preference in this country for free or slave institutions; and consequently every sentiment he utters discards the idea that
there is any wrong in slavery. Every thing that emanates from him or his coadjutors in their course of policy, carefully excludes the thought that
there is any thing wrong in slavery. All their arguments, if you will consider them, will be seen to exclude the thought that there is any thing
whatever wrong in slavery. If you will take the Judge's speeches, and select the short and pointed sentences expressed by him-as his declaration
that he "don't care whether slavery is voted up or down"- you will see at once that this is perfectly logical, if you do not admit that slavery is
wrong. If you do admit that it is wrong, Judge Douglas cannot logically say he don't care whether a wrong is voted up or voted down. Judge
Douglas declares that if any community want slavery they have a right to have it. He can say that logically, if he says that there is no wrong in
slavery; but if you admit that there is a wrong in it, he cannot logically say that any body has a right to do wrong. He insists that, upon the score
of equality, the owners of slaves and owners of property-of horses and every other sort of property-should be alike and hold them alike in a new
Territory. That is perfectly logical, if the two species of property are alike and are equally founded in right. But if you admit that one of them is
wrong, you cannot institute any equality between right and wrong. And from this difference of sentiment-the belief on the part of one that the
institution is wrong, and a policy springing from that belief which looks to the arrest of the enlargement of that wrong; and this other sentiment,
that it is no wrong, and a policy sprung from that sentiment which will tolerate no idea of preventing that wrong from growing larger, and looks
to there never being an end of it through all the existence of things,-arises the real difference between Judge Douglas and his friends on the one
hand, and the Republicans on the other. Now, I confess myself as belonging to that class in the country who contemplate slavery as a moral,
social and political evil, having due regard for its actual existence amongst us and the difficulties of getting rid of it in any satisfactory way, and
to all the Constitutional obligations which have been thrown about it; but, nevertheless, desire a policy that looks to the prevention of it as a
wrong, and looks hopefully to the time when as a wrong it may come to an end.
Judge Douglas has again, for, I believe, the fifth time, if not the seventh, in my presence, reiterated his charge of a conspiracy or combination
between the National Democrats and Republicans. What evidence Judge Douglas has upon his subject I know not, inasmuch as he never favors
us with any. I have said upon a former occasion, and I do not choose to suppress it now, that I have no objection to the division in the Judge's
party. He got it up himself. It was all his and their work. He had, I think, a great deal more to do with the steps that led to the Lecompton
Constitution than Mr. Buchanan had; though at last, when they reached it, they quarreled over it, and their friends divided upon it. I am very free
to confess to Judge Douglas that I have no objection to the division; but I defy the Judge to show any evidence that I have in any way promoted
that division, unless he insists on being a witness himself in merely saying so. I can give all fair friends of Judge Douglas here to understand
exactly the view that Republicans take in regard to that division. Don't you remember how two years ago the opponents of the Democratic party
were divided between Fremont and Fillmore? I guess you do. Any Democrat who remembers that division, will remember also that he was at the
time very glad of it, and then he will be able to see all there is between the National Democrats and the Republicans. What we now think of the
two divisions of Democrats, you then thought of the Fremont and Fillmore divisions. That is all there is of it.
But, if the Judge continues to put forward the declaration that there is an unholy and unnatural alliance between the Republican and the National
Democrats, I now want to enter my protest against receiving him as an entirely competent witness upon that subject. I want to call to the Judge's
attention an attack he made upon me in the first one of these debates, at Ottawa, on the 21st of August. In order to fix extreme Abolitionism upon
me, Judge Douglas read a set of resolutions which he declared had been passed by a Republican State Convention, in October, 1854, at
Springfield, Illinois, and he declared I had taken part in that Convention. It turned out that although a few men calling themselves an antiNebraska State Convention had sat at Springfield about that time, yet neither did I take any part in it, nor did it pass the resolutions or any such
resolutions as Judge Douglas read. So apparent had it become that the resolutions which he read had not been passed at Springfield at all, nor by
a State Convention in which I had taken part, that seven days afterward, at Freeport, Judge Douglas declared that he had been misled by Charles
H. Lanphier, editor of the State Register, and Thomas L. Harris, member of Congress in that District, and he promised in that speech that when he
went to Springfield he would investigate the matter. Since then Judge Douglas has been to Springfield, and I presume has made the investigation;
but a month has passed since he has been there, and so far as I know, he has made no report of the result of his investigation. I have waited as I
think sufficient time for the report of that investigation, and I have some curiosity to see and hear it. A fraud-an absolute forgery was committed,
and the perpetration of it was traced to the three-Lanphier, Harris and Douglas. Whether it can be narrowed in any way so as to exonerate any one
of them, is what Judge Douglas's report would probably show.
It is true that the set of resolutions read by Judge Douglas were published in the Illinois State Register on the 16th of October, 1854, as being the
resolutions of an anti-Nebraska Convention, which had sat in that same month of October, at Springfield. But it is also true that the publication in
the Register was a forgery then, and the question is still behind, which of the three, if not all of them, committed that forgery? The idea that it was
done by mistake, is absurd. The article in the Illinois State Register contains part of the real proceedings of that Springfield Convention, showing
that the writer of the article had the real proceedings before him, and purposely threw out the genuine resolutions passed by the Convention, and
fraudulently substituted the others. Lanphier then, as now, was the editor of the Register, so that there seems to be but little room for his escape.
But then it is to be borne in mind that Lanphier has less interest in the object of that forgery than either of the other two. The main object of that
forgery at that time was to beat Yates and elect Harris to Congress, and that object was known to be exceedingly dear to Judge Douglas at that
time. Harris and Douglas were both in Springfield when the Convention was in session, and although they both left before the fraud appeared in
the Register, subsequent events show that they have both had their eyes fixed upon that Convention.
The fraud having been apparently successful upon the occasion, both Harris and Douglas have more than once since then been attempting to put
it to new uses. As the fisherman's wife, whose drowned husband was brought home with his body full of eels, said when she was asked, "What
was to be done with him?" "Take the eels out and set him again"; so Harris and Douglas have shown a disposition to take the eels out of that stale
fraud by which they gained Harris's election, and set the fraud again more than once. On the 9th of July, 1856, Douglas attempted a repetition of
it upon Trumbull on the floor of the Senate of the United States, as will appear from the appendix of the Congressional Globe of that date.
On the 9th of August, Harris attempted it again upon Norton in the House of Representatives, as will appear by the same documents-the appendix
to the Congressional Globe of that date. On the 21st of August last, all three-Lanphier, Douglas and Harris-reattempted it upon me at Ottawa. It
has been clung to and played out again and again as an exceedingly high trump by this blessed trio. And now that it has been discovered publicly
to be a fraud, we find that Judge Douglas manifests no surprise at it at all. He makes no complaint of Lanphier, who must have known it to be a
fraud from the beginning. He, Lanphier and Harris, are just as cozy now, and just as active in the concoction of new schemes as they were before
the general discovery of this fraud. Now all this is very natural if they are all alike guilty in that fraud, and it is very unnatural if any one of them
is innocent. Lanphier perhaps insists that the rule of honor among thieves does not quite require him to take all upon himself, and consequently
my friend Judge Douglas finds it difficult to make a satisfactory report upon his investigation. But meanwhile the three are agreed that each is "a
most honorable man."
Judge Douglas requires an indorsement of his truth and honor by a re-election to the United States Senate, and he makes and reports against me
and against Judge Trumbull, day after day, charges which we know to be utterly untrue, without for a moment seeming to think that this one
unexplained fraud, which he promised to investigate, will be the least drawback to his claim to belief. Harris ditto. He asks a re-election to the
lower House of Congress without seeming to remember at all that he is involved in this dishonorable fraud! The Illinois State Register, edited by
Lanphier, then, as now, the central organ of both Harris and Douglas, continues to din the public ear with this assertion without seeming to
suspect that these assertions are at all lacking in title to belief.
After all, the question still recurs upon us, how did that fraud originally get into the State Register? Lanphier then, as now, was the editor of that
paper. Lanphier knows. Lanphier cannot be ignorant of how and by whom it was originally concocted. Can he be induced to tell, or if he has told,
can Judge Douglas be induced to tell how it originally was concocted? It may be true that Lanphier insists that the two men for whose benefit it
was originally devised, shall at least bear their share of it! How that is, I do not know, and while it remains unexplained, I hope to be pardoned if
I insist that the mere fact of Judge Douglas making charges against Trumbull and myself is not quite sufficient evidence to establish them!
While we were at Freeport, in one of these joint discussions, I answered certain interrogatories which Judge Douglas had propounded to me, and
there in turn propounded some to him, which he in a sort of way answered. The third one of these interrogatories I have with me and wish now to
make some comments upon it. It was in these words: "If the Supreme Court of the United States shall decide that the States cannot exclude
slavery from their limits, are you in favor of acquiescing in, adhering to and following such decision, as a rule of political action?"
To this interrogatory Judge Douglas made no answer in any just sense of the word. He contented himself with sneering at the thought that it was
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possible for the Supreme Court ever to make such a decision. He sneered at me for propounding the interrogatory. I had not propounded it
without some reflection, and I wish now to address to this audience some remarks upon it.
In the second clause of the sixth article, I believe it is, of the Constitution of the United States, we find the following language: "This Constitution
and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made under the authority of
the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any thing in the Constitution or laws
of any State to the contrary notwithstanding."
The essence of the Dred Scott case is compressed into the sentence which I will now read: "Now, as we have already said in an earlier part of this
opinion, upon a different point, the right of property in a slave is distinctly and expressly affirmed in the Constitution." I repeat it, "The right of
property in a slave is distinctly and expressly affirmed in the Constitution!" What is it to be "affirmed" in the Constitution? Made firm in the
Constitution -so made that it cannot be separated from the Constitution without breaking the Constitution-durable as the Constitution, and part of
the Constitution. Now, remembering the provision of the Constitution which I have read, affirming that that instrument is the supreme law of the
land; that the Judges of every State shall be bound by it, any law or Constitution of any State to the contrary notwithstanding; that the right of
property in a slave is affirmed in that Constitution, is made, formed into, and cannot be separated from it without breaking it; durable as the
instrument; part of the instrument; -what follows as a short and even syllogistic argument from it? I think it follows, and I submit to the
consideration of men capable of arguing, whether as I state it, in syllogistic form, the argument has any fault in it?
Nothing in the Constitution or laws of any State can destroy a right distinctly and expressly affirmed in the Constitution of the United States.
The right of property in a slave is distinctly and expressly affirmed in the Constitution of the United States.
Therefore, nothing in the Constitution or laws of any State can destroy the right of property in a slave.
I believe that no fault can be pointed out in that argument; assuming the truth of the premises, the conclusion, so far as I have capacity at all to
understand it, follows inevitably. There is a fault in it as I think, but the fault is not in the reasoning; but the falsehood in fact is a fault of the
premises. I believe that the right of property in a slave is not distinctly and expressly affirmed in the Constitution, and Judge Douglas thinks it is.
I believe that the Supreme Court and the advocates of that decision may search in vain for the place in the Constitution where the right of a slave
is distinctly and expressly affirmed. I say, therefore, that I think one of the premises is not true in fact. But it is true with Judge Douglas. It is true
with the Supreme Court who pronounced it. They are estopped from denying it, and being estopped from denying it, the conclusion follows that
the Constitution of the United States being the supreme law, no constitution or law can interfere with it. It being affirmed in the decision that the
right of property in a slave is distinctly and expressly affirmed in the Constitution, the conclusion inevitably follows that no State law or
constitution can destroy that right. I then say to Judge Douglas and to all others, that I think it will take a better answer than a sneer to show that
those who have said that the right of property in a slave is distinctly and expressly affirmed in the Constitution, are not prepared to show that no
constitution or law can destroy that right. I say I believe it will take a far better argument than a mere sneer to show to the minds of intelligent
men that whoever has so said, is not prepared, whenever public sentiment is so far advanced as to justify it, to say the other. This is but an
opinion, and the opinion of one very humble man; but it is my opinion that the Dred Scott decision, as it is, never would have been made in its
present form if the party that made it had not been sustained previously by the elections. My own opinion is, that the new Dred Scott decision,
deciding against the right of the people of the States to exclude slavery, will never be made, if that party is not sustained by the elections. I
believe, further, that it is just as sure to be made as to-morrow is to come, if that party shall be sustained. I have said, upon a former occasion, and
I repeat it now, that the course of argument that Judge Douglas makes use of upon this subject (I charge not his motives in this), is preparing the
public mind for that new Dred Scott decision. I have asked him again to point out to me the reasons for his first adherence to the Dred Scott
decision as it is. I have turned his attention to the fact that General Jackson differed with him in regard to the political obligation of a Supreme
Court decision. I have asked his attention to the fact that Jefferson differed with him in regard to the political obligation of a Supreme Court
decision. Jefferson said, that "Judges are as honest as other men, and not more so."And he said, substantially, that "whenever a free people should
give up in absolute submission to any department of government, retaining for themselves no appeal from it, their liberties were gone." I have
asked his attention to the fact that the Cincinnati platform, upon which he says he stands, disregards a time-honored decision of the Supreme
Court, in denying the power of Congress to establish a National Bank. I have asked his attention to the fact that he himself was one of the most
active instruments at one time in breaking down the Supreme Court of the State of Illinois, because it had made a decision distasteful to him-a
struggle ending in the remarkable circumstance of his sitting down as one of the new Judges who were to overslaugh that decision-getting his title
of Judge in that very way.
So far in this controversy I can get no answer at all from Judge Douglas upon these subjects. Not one can I get from him, except that he swells
himself up and says, "All of us who stand by the decision of the Supreme Court are the friends of the Constitution; all you fellows that dare
question it in any way, are the enemies of the Constitution." Now, in this very devoted adherence to this decision, in opposition to all the great
political leaders whom he has recognized as leaders-in opposition to his former self and history, there is something very marked. And the manner
in which he adheres to it-not as being right upon the merits, as he conceives (because he did not discuss that at all), but as being absolutely
obligatory upon every one simply because of the source from whence it comes-as that which no man can gainsay, whatever it may be-this is
another marked feature of his adherence to that decision. It marks it in this respect, that it commits him to the next decision, whenever it comes,
as being as obligatory as this one, since he does not investigate it, and won't inquire whether this opinion is right or wrong. So he takes the next
one without inquiring whether it is right or wrong. He teaches men this doctrine, and in so doing prepares the public mind to take the next
decision when it comes, without any inquiry. In this I think I argue fairly (without questioning motives at all), that Judge Douglas is more
ingeniously and powerfully preparing the public mind to take that decision when it comes; and not only so, but he is doing it in various other
ways. In these general maxims about liberty-in his assertions that he "don't care whether slavery is voted up or voted down;" that "whoever wants
slavery has a right to have it;" that "upon principles of equality it should be allowed to go every where;" that "there is no inconsistency between
free and slave institutions." In this he is also preparing (whether purposely or not) the way for making the institution of slavery national! I repeat
again, for I wish no misunderstanding, that I do not charge that he means it so; but I call upon your minds to inquire, if you were going to get the
best instrument you could, and then set it to work in the most ingenious way, to prepare the public mind for this movement, operating in the free
States, where there is now an abhorrence of the institution of slavery, could you find an instrument so capable of doing it as Judge Douglas? or
one employed in so apt a way to do it?
I have said once before, and I will repeat it now, that Mr. Clay, when he was once answering an objection to the Colonization Society, that it had
a tendency to the ultimate emancipation of the slaves, said that "those who would repress all tendencies to liberty and ultimate emancipation must
do more than put down the benevolent efforts of the Colonization Society-they must go back to the era of our liberty and independence, and
muzzle the cannon that thunders its annual joyous return-they must blot out the moral lights around us-they must penetrate the human soul, and
eradicate the light of reason and the love of liberty!" And I do think-I repeat, though I said it on a former occasion-that Judge Douglas, and
whoever like him teaches that the negro has no share, humble though it may be, in the Declaration of Independence, is going back to the era of
our liberty and independence, and, so far as in him lies, muzzling the cannon that thunders its annual joyous return; that he is blowing out the
moral lights around us, when he contends that whoever wants slaves has a right to hold them; that he is penetrating, so far as lies in his power, the
human soul, and eradicating the light of reason and the love of liberty, when he is in every possible way preparing the public mind, by his vast
influence, for making the institution of slavery perpetual and national.
There is, my friends, only one other point to which I will call your attention for the remaining time that I have left me, and perhaps I shall not
occupy the entire time that I have, as that one point may not take me clear through it.
Among the interrogatories that Judge Douglas propounded to me at Freeport, there was one in about this language: "Are you opposed to the
acquisition of any further territory to the United States, unless slavery shall first be prohibited therein?" I answered as I thought, in this way, that I
am not generally opposed to the acquisition of additional territory, and that I would support a proposition for the acquisition of additional
territory, according as my supporting it was or was not calculated to aggravate this slavery question amongst us. I then proposed to Judge
Douglas another interrogatory, which was correlative to that: "Are you in favor of acquiring additional territory in disregard of how it may affect
us upon the slavery question?" Judge Douglas answered, that is, in his own way he answered it. I believe that, although he took a good many
words to answer it, it was a little more fully answered than any other. The substance of his answer was, that this country would continue to
expand-that it would need additional territory-that it was as absurd to suppose that we could continue upon our present territory, enlarging in
population as we are, as it would be to hoop a boy twelve years of age, and expect him to grow to man's size without bursting the hoops.
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[Laughter.] I believe it was something like that. Consequently he was in favor of the acquisition of further territory, as fast as we might need it, in
disregard of how it might affect the slavery question. I do not say this as giving his exact language, but he said so substantially, and he would
leave the question of slavery where the territory was acquired, to be settled by the people of the acquired territory. ["That's the doctrine."] May be
it is; let us consider that for a while. This will probably, in the run of things, become one of the concrete manifestations of this slavery question. If
Judge Douglas's policy upon this question succeeds and gets fairly settled down, until all opposition is crushed out, the next thing will be a grab
for the territory poor Mexico, an invasion of the rich lands of South America, then the adjoining islands will follow, each one of which promises
additional slave fields. And this question is to be left to the people of those countries for settlement. When we shall get Mexico, I don't know
whether the Judge will be in favor of the Mexican people that we get with it settling that question for themselves and all others; because we know
the Judge has a great horror for mongrels, and I understand that the people of Mexico are most decidedly a race of mongrels. I understand that
there is not more than one person there out of eight who is pure white, and I suppose from the Judge's previous declaration that when we get
Mexico or any considerable portion of it, that he will be in favor of these mongrels settling the question, which would bring him somewhat into
collision with his horror of an inferior race.
It is to be remembered, though, that this power of acquiring additional territory is a power confided to the President and Senate of the United
States. It is a power not under the control of the representatives of the people any further than they, the President and the Senate, can be
considered the representatives of the people. Let me illustrate that by a case we have in our history. When we acquired the territory from Mexico
in the Mexican war, the House of Representatives, composed of the immediate representatives of the people, all the time insisted that the territory
thus to be acquired should be brought in upon condition that slavery should be forever prohibited therein, upon the terms and in the language that
slavery had been prohibited from coming into this country. That was insisted upon constantly, and never failed to call forth an assurance that any
territory thus acquired should have that prohibition in it, so far as the House of Representatives was concerned. But at last the President and
Senate acquired the territory without asking the House of Representatives any thing about it, and took it without that prohibition. They have the
power of acquiring territory without the immediate representatives of the People being called upon to say any thing about it, and thus furnishing a
very apt and powerful means of bringing new territory into the Union, and when it is once brought into the country, involving us anew in this
slavery agitation. It is, therefore, as I think, a very important question for the consideration of the American people, whether the policy of
bringing in additional territory, without considering at all how it will operate upon the safety of the Union in reference to this one great disturbing
element in our national politics, shall be adopted as the policy of the country. You will bear in mind that it is to be acquired, according to the
Judge's view, as fast as it is needed, and the indefinite part of this proposition is that we have only Judge Douglas and his class of men to decide
how fast it is needed. We have no clear and certain way of determining or demonstrating how fast territory is needed by the necessities of the
country. Whoever wants to go out fillibustering, then, thinks that more territory is needed. Whoever wants wider slave fields, feels sure that some
additional territory is needed as slave territory. Then it is as easy to show the necessity of additional slave territory as it is to assert any thing that
is incapable of absolute demonstration. Whatever motive a man or a set of men may have for making annexation of property or territory, it is very
easy to assert, but much less easy to disprove, that it is necessary for the wants of the country.
And now it only remains for me to say that I think it is a very grave question for the people of this Union to consider whether, in view of the fact
that this slavery question has been the only one that has ever endangered our Republican institutions-the only one that has ever threatened or
menaced a dissolution of the Union-that has ever disturbed us in such a way as to make us fear for the prepetuity of our liberty-in view of these
facts, I think it is an exceedingly interesting and important question for this people to consider, whether we shall engage in the policy of acquiring
additional territory, discarding altogether from our consideration, while obtaining new territory, the question how it may affect us in regard to this
the only endangering element to our liberties and national greatness. The Judge's view has been expressed. I, in my answer to his question, have
expressed mine. I think it will become an important and practical question. Our views are before the public. I am willing and anxious that they
should consider them fully-that they should turn it about and consider the importance of the question, and arrive at a just conclusion as to whether
it is or is not wise in the people of this Union, in the acquisition of new territory, to consider whether it will add to the disturbance that is existing
amongst us-whether it will add to the one only danger that has ever threatened the perpetuity of the Union or our own liberties. I think it is
extremely important that they shall decide, and rightly decide, that question before entering upon that policy.
And now, my friends, having said the little I wish to say upon this head, whether I have occupied the whole of the remnant of my time or not, I
believe I could not enter upon any new topics so as to treat it fully without transcending my time, which I would not for a moment think of doing.
I give way to Judge Douglas.

Mr. Douglas's Reply
When Senator Douglas rose to reply to Mr. Lincoln, six cheers were called for in the crowd, and given with great spirit. He said, quieting the
applause:
Gentlmen: The highest compliment you can pay me during the brief half hour that I have to conclude is by observing a strict silence. I desire to
be heard rather than to be applauded. (Good.)
The first criticism that Mr. Lincoln makes on my speech was that it was in substance what I have said every where else in the State where I have
addressed the people. I wish I could say the same of his speech. (Good; you have him, and applause.) Why, the reason I complain of him is
because he makes one speech north and another south. (That's so.) Because he has one set of sentiments for the abolition counties and another set
for the counties opposed to abolitionism. (Hit him over the knuckles.) My point of complaint against him is that I cannot induce him to hold up
the same standard, to carry the same flag in all parts of the State. He does not pretend, and no other man will, that I have one set of principles for
Galesburgh and another for Charleston. (No. no.) He does not pretend that I hold to one doctrine in Chicago and an opposite one in Jonesboro. I
have proved that he has a different set of principles for each of these localities. All I asked of him was that he should deliver the speech that he
has made here to-day in Coles county instead of in old Knox. It would have settled the question between us in that doubtful county. Here I
understand him to reaffirm the doctrine of negro equality, and to assert that by the Declaration of Independence the negro is declared equal to the
white man. He tells you to-day that the negro was included in the Declaration of Independence when it asserted that all men were created equal.
("We believe it.") Very well. (Here an uproar arose, persons in various parts of the crowd indulging in cat calls, groans, cheers, and other noises,
preventing the speaker from proceeding.)
MR. DOUGLAS-Gentlemen, I ask you to remember that Mr. Lincoln was listened to respectfully, and I have the right to insist that I shall not be
interrupted during my reply.
MR. LINCOLN-I hope that silence will be preserved.
MR. DOUGLAS-Mr. Lincoln asserts to-day as he did at Chicago, that the negro was included in that clause of the Declaration of Independence
which says that all men were created equal and endowed by the Creator with certain inalienable rights, among which are life, liberty, and the
pursuit of happiness. (Ain't that so?) If the negro was made his equal and mine, if that equality was established by Divine law, and was the
negro's inalienable right, how came he to say at Charleston to the Kentuckians residing in that section of our State, that the negro was physically
inferior to the white man, belonged to an inferior race, and he was for keeping him always in that inferior condition. (Good.) I wish you to bear
these things in mind. At Charleston he said that the negro belonged to an inferior race, and that he was for keeping him in that inferior condition.
There he gave the people to understand that there was no moral question involved, because the inferiority being established, it was only a
question of degree and not a question of right; here, to-day, instead of making it a question of degree, he makes it a moral question, says that it is
a great crime to hold the negro in that inferior condition. (He's right.) Is he right now or was he right in Charleston? (Both.) He is right then, sir,
in your estimation, not because he is consistent, but because he can trim his principles any way in any section, so as to secure votes. All I desire
of him is that he will declare the same principles in the south that he does in the north.
But did you notice how he answered my position that a man should hold the same doctrines throughout the length and breadth of this Republic?
He said, "Would Judge Douglas go to Russia and proclaim the same principles he does here?" I would remind him that Russia is not under the
American Constitution. ("Good," and laughter.) If Russia was a part of the American Republic, under our Federal Constitution, and I was sworn
to support the Constitution, I would maintain the same doctrine in Russia that I do in Illinois. (Cheers.) The slaveholding States are governed by
the same Federal Constitution as ourselves, and hence a man's principles, in order to be in harmony with the Constitution, must be the same in the
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south as they are in the north, the same in the free States as they are in the slave States. Whenever a man advocates one set of principles in one
section, and another set in another section, his opinions are in violation of the spirit of the Constitution which he has sworn to support. ("That's
so.") When Mr. Lincoln went to Congress in 1847, and laying his hand upon the Holy Evangelists, made a solemn vow in the presence of high
Heaven that he would be faithful to the Constitution-what did he mean? the Constitution as he expounds it in Galesburg, or the Constitution as he
expounds it in Charleston. (Cheers.)
Mr. Lincoln has devoted considerable time to the circumstance that at Ottawa I read a series of resolutions as having been adopted at Springfield,
in this State, on the 4th or 5th of October, 1854, which happened not to have been adopted there. He has used hard names; has dared to talk about
fraud, (laughter), about forgery, and has insinuated that there was a conspiracy between Mr. Lanphier, Mr. Harris, and myself to perpetrate a
forgery. (Renewed laughter.) Now, bear in mind that he does not deny that these resolutions were adopted in a majority of all the Republican
counties of this State in that year; he does not deny that they were declared to be the platform of this Republican party in the first Congressional
District, in the second, in the third, and in many counties of the fourth, and that they thus became the platform of his party in a majority of the
counties upon which he now relies for support; he does not deny the truthfulness of the resolutions, but takes exception to the spot on which they
were adopted. He takes to himself great merit because he thinks they were not adopted on the right spot for me to use them against him, just as he
was very severe in Congress upon the Government of his country when he thought that he had discovered that the Mexican war was not begun in
the right spot, and was therefore unjust. (Renewed laughter.) He tries very hard to make out that there is something very extraordinary in the
place where the thing was done, and not in the thing itself. I never believed before that Abraham Lincoln would be guilty of what he has done this
day in regard to those resolutions. In the first place, the moment it was intimated to me that they had been adopted at Aurora and Rockford
instead of Springfield, I did not wait for him to call my attention to the fact, but led off and explained in my first meeting after the Ottawa debate,
what the mistake was, and how it had been made. (That's so.) I supposed that for an honest man, conscious of his own rectitude, that explanation
would be sufficient. I did not wait for him, after the mistake was made, to call my attention to it, but frankly explained it at once as an honest man
would. (Cheers.) I also gave the authority on which I had stated that these resolutions were adopted by the Springfield Republican Convention.
That I had seen them quoted by Major Harris in a debate in Congress, as having been adopted by the first Republican State Convention in Illinois,
and that I had written to him and asked him for the authority as to the time and place of their adoption; that Major Harris being extremely ill,
Charles H. Lanphier had written to me for him, that they were adopted at Springfield, on the 5th of October, 1854, and had sent me a copy of the
Springfield paper containing them. I read them from the newspaper just as Mr. Lincoln reads the proceedings of meetings held years ago from the
newspapers. After giving that explanation, I did not think there was an honest man in the State of Illinois who doubted that I had been led into the
error, if it was such, innocently, in the way I detailed; and I will now say that I do not now believe that there is an honest man on the face of the
globe who will not regard with abhorrence and disgust Mr. Lincoln's insinuations of my complicity in that forgery, if it was a forgery. (Cheers.)
Does Mr. Lincoln wish to push these things to the point of personal difficulties here? I commenced this contest by treating him courteously and
kindly; I always spoke of him in words of respect, and in return he has sought, and is now seeking, to divert public attention from the enormity of
his revolutionary principles by impeaching men's sincerity and integrity, and inviting personal quarrels. (Give it to him, and cheers.)
I desired to conduct this contest with him like a gentleman, but I spurn the insinuation of complicity and fraud made upon the simple
circumstances of an editor of a newspaper having made a mistake as to the place where a thing was done, but not as to the thing itself. These
resolutions were the platform of this Republican party of Mr. Lincoln's of that year. They were adopted in a majority of the Republican counties
in the State; and when I asked him at Ottawa whether they formed the platform upon which he stood, he did not answer, and I could not get an
answer out of him. He then thought, as I thought, that those resolutions were adopted at the Springfield Convention, but excused himself by
saying that he was not there when they were adopted, but had gone to Tazewell court in order to avoid being present at the Convention. He saw
them published as having been adopted at Springfield, and so did I, and he knew that if there was a mistake in regard to them, that I had nothing
under heaven to do with it. Besides, you find that in all these northern countries where the Republican candidates are running pledged to him, that
the Conventions which nominated them adopted that identical platform. One cardinal point in that platform which he shrinks from is this-that
there shall be no more slave States admitted into the Union, even if the people want them. Lovejoy stands pledged against the admission of any
more slave States. (Right, so do we.) So do you, you say. Farnsworth stands pledged against the admission of any more slave States. (Most right.)
Washburne stands pledged the same way. (Good, good.) The candidate for the Legislature who is running on Lincoln's ticket in Henderson and
Warren, stands committed by his vote in the Legislature to the same thing, and I am informed, but do not know of the fact, that your candidate
here is also so pledged. (Hurrah for him, good.) Now, you Republicans all hurra for him, and for the doctrine of "no more slave States," and yet
Lincoln tells you that his conscience will not permit him to sanction that doctrine. (Immense applause.) And complains because the resolutions I
read at Ottawa made him, as a member of the party, responsible for sanctioning the doctrine of no more slave States. You are one way, you
confess, and he is or pretends to be the other, and yet you are both governed by principle in supporting one another. If it be true, as I have shown
it is, that the whole Republican party in the northern part of the State stands committed to the doctrine of no more slave States, and that this same
doctrine is repudiated by the Republicans in the other part of the State, I wonder whether Mr. Lincoln and his party do not present the case which
he cited from the Scriptures, of a house divided against itself which cannot stand! (Tremendous shouts of applause.) I desire to know what are
Mr. Lincoln's principles and the principles of his party? I hold, and the party with which I am identified hold, that the people of each State, old
and new, have the right to decide the slavery question for themselves, ("That's it," "Right," and immense applause,) and when I used the remark
that I did not care whether slavery was voted up or down, I used it in the connection that I was for allowing Kansas to do just as she pleased on
the slavery question. I said that I did not care whether they voted slavery up or down, because they had the right to do as they pleased on the
question, and therefore my action would not be controlled by any such consideration. ("That's the doctrine.) Why cannot Abraham Lincoln, and
the party with which he acts, speak out their principles so that they may be understood? Why do they claim to be one thing in one part of the
State and another in the other part? Whenever I allude to the Abolition doctrines, which he considers a slander to be charged with being in favor
of, you all endorse them, and hurrah for them, not knowing that your candidate is ashamed to acknowledge them. (I have a few words to say upon
the Dred Scott decision, which has troubled the brain of Mr. Lincoln so much. (Laughter.) He insists that that decision would carry slavery into
the free States, notwithstanding that the decision says directly the opposite; and goes into a long argument to make you believe that I am in favor
of, and would sanction the doctrine that would allow slaves to be brought here and held as slaves contrary to our Constitution and laws. Mr.
Lincoln knew better when he asserted this; he knew that one newspaper, and so far as is within my knowledge but one, ever asserted that
doctrine, and that I was the first man in either House of Congress that read that article in debate, and denounced it on the floor of the Senate as
revolutionary. When the Washington Union, on the 17th of last November, published an article to that effect, I branded it at once, and denounced
it, and hence the Union has been pursuing me ever since. Mr. Toombs, of Georgia, replied to me, and said that there was not a man in any of the
slave States south of the Potomac river that held any such doctrine. Mr. Lincoln knows that there is not a member of the Supreme Court who
holds that doctrine; he knows that every one of them, as shown by their opinions, holds the reverse. Why this attempt, then, to bring the Supreme
Court into disrepute among the people? It looks as if there was an effort being made to destroy public confidence in the highest judicial tribunal
on earth. Suppose he succeeds in destroying public confidence in the court, so that the people will not respect its decisions, but will feel at liberty
to disregard them, and resist the laws of the land, what will he have gained? He will have changed the Government from one of laws into that of a
mob, in which the strong arm of violence will be substituted for the decisions of the courts of justice. ("That's so.") He complains because I did
not go into an argument reviewing Chief Justice Taney's opinion, and the other opinions of the different judges, to determine whether their
reasoning is right or wrong on the questions of law. What use would that be? He wants to take an appeal from the Supreme Court to this meeting
to determine whether the questions of law were decided properly. He is going to appeal from the Supreme Court of the United States to every
town meeting in the hope that he can excite a prejudice against that court, and on the wave of that prejudice ride into the Senate of the United
States, when he could not get there on his own principles, or his own merits. (Laughter and cheers; "hit him again.") Suppose he should succeed
in getting into the Senate of the United States, what then will he have to do with the decision of the Supreme Court in the Dred Scott case? Can
he reverse that decision when he gets there? Can he act upon it? Has the Senate any right to reverse it or revise it? He will not pretend that it has.
Then why drag the matter into this contest, unless for the purpose of making a false issue, by which he can direct public attention from the real
issue.
He has cited General Jackson in justification of the war he is making on the decision of the court. Mr. Lincoln misunderstands the history of the
country, if he believes there is any parallel in the two cases. It is true that the Supreme Court once decided that if a Bank of the United States was
a necessary fiscal agent of the Government, it was Constitutional, and if not, that it was unconstitutional, and also, that whether or not it was
necessary for that purpose, was a political question for Congress and not a judicial one for the courts to determine. Hence the court would not
determine the bank unconstitutional. Jackson respected the decision, obeyed the law, executed it and carried it into effect during its existence;
(that's so,) but after the charter of the bank expired and a proposition was made to create a new bank, General Jackson said, "it is unnecessary and
improper, and, therefore, I am against it on Constitutional grounds as well as those of expediency." Is Congress bound to pass every act that is
Constitutional? Why, there are a thousand things that are Constitutional, but yet are inexpedient and unnecessary, and you surely would not vote
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for them merely because you had the right to? And because General Jackson would not do a thing which he had a right to do, but did not deem
expedient or proper, Mr. Lincoln is going to justify himself in doing that which he has no right to do. (Laughter.) I ask him, whether he is not
bound to respect and obey the decisions of the Supreme Court as well as me? The Constitution has created that court to decide all Constitutional
questions in the last resort, and when such decisions have been made, they become the law of the land, (that's so,) and you, and he, and myself,
and every other good citizen are bound by them. Yet, he argues that I am bound by their decisions and he is not. He says that their decisions are
binding on Democrats, but not on Republicans. (Laughter and applause.) Are not Republicans bound by the laws of the land as well as
Democrats? And when the court has fixed the construction of the Constitution on the validity of a given law, is not their decision binding upon
Republicans as well as upon Democrats? (It ought to be.) Is it possible that you Republicans have the right to raise your mobs and oppose the
laws of the land and the constituted authorities, and yet hold us Democrats bound to obey them? My time is within half a minute of expiring, and
all I have to say is, that I stand by the laws of the land. (That's it; hurrah for Douglas.) I stand by the Constitution as our fathers made it, by the
laws as they are enacted, and by the decisions of the court upon all points within their jurisdiction as they are pronounced by the highest tribunal
on earth; and any man who resists these must resort to mob law and violence to overturn the government of laws.

Source: National Park Service
http://www.nps.gov/archive/liho/debates.htm
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